Twins

I go to meet a friend in his office.  We’re to discuss an essay I’ve written–the essay on memory and memorial in Luther and Augustine, modern tragedy and the temporality of forgiveness.  Thumbing the corner of his copy he asks what I’m up to in words, “I mean, what are you trying to do with an essay like this?”  I talk of warring twins in the womb, the ambition to be legible as a scholar, and the other desire–more like a compulsion–to confess myself.  He laughs, “Right, you cite your own conversations throughout.”  We talk around my topics, then his topics.  He’s writing on Thoreau. “Speaking of confession,” he begins, “I don’t buy it, don’t buy him.”  I’m astonished, “You don’t buy Thoreau?”  I tease, “Is this about his Sunday dinners with mother?  He wasn’t a cheat you know.”  He laughs again, “No, no, it isn’t that.”  What then?  ”It’s this immanent transcendent thing.  You know, epic battles in the sand.”  ”You mean the ants?  That’s great stuff!”  ”Is it?  I mean I get why people like it, and I certainly like some of what’s come of it–the American nature essay tradition, all that.  But there’s something overblown about his religious ambitions, his philosophical ambitions.”  I dare him to convince me.  He tries: “These  small moments of notice, of attention, of–yeah, I grant you–real beauty are called in to carry too much weight.  I don’t like his divinized quotidian, the personality and profundity is all out of proportion.”  ”So give me an example,” I insist, “Heaven below as well as above?  The project of securing vital heat?”  ”Well, yeah, okay, take the fire.  He gets bogged down in the details as if the details are what matter.  And maybe they do matter if what he’s telling us is the story of how he went to the woods, etc.  But you know if he were to just stick to the fire–the fire itself, in all of its generality and elemental meaningfulness–he might get closer to the kinds of truths he seems to be after.”  ”You’re against the epiphanic?”  ”No, not against the epiphanic, but I want epiphany to count for something.  I don’t want it to get lost in the wash of flickering colors and sounds.”  I feel I’m beginning to understand,  ”You’re against a Mary Oliver approach to philosophy?”  ”Yes that’s it!” he crows.  And then I’m laughing and quoting myself in derision, ” . . .  a heron stalking craw in the still-mineral-rich shallows . . . ”  He rolls his eyes and slaps his knee, “Exactly!”  I’m surprised by the purity of my own playfulness, neither cynical, nor self-protective; the line which I had liked at the time, now drums thin-walled; I’m glad to be free of it, moving on.  ”So what’s worthy of wonder?”  I charge him, “The stars above and the moral law within?”  ”For starters,” he replies, “And then there’s the view form high places, mountain tops, outer space.”  Now I’m rolling my eyes, “No, no, I won’t go in for that Hadotian cosmic consciousness stuff.  It’s too removed, too abstract.  You would fault romanticism it’s pedestrian eye for the particular, but there’s real humility there, an acknowledgement of what’s given us, what perspective is ours.”  ”Who’s to say what’s ours, what’s given us?” he challenges me, “It’s no less natural, is arguably more natural, for us to try to speak for mankind, to cast ourselves up and out,” he gestures, “and seek a sense of who we are in the scheme of things.”  ”But that’s just it,” I counter, “What ‘scheme of things’ are we talking about?  Isn’t this a recipe for disaster?  All of human history running up to the here and now.  A grand sense of purpose . . . ”  He cuts me off, “Sure, it might work that way, might feed our delusions of grandeur, but what if it just doesn’t?  What if it just so happens that when people exercise themselves in these ways they are wiser for it, more stable, more just.  Surely you’re not so principled or logically driven to deny . . . ”  I cut in to assure him, “No, of course I’m not.  Our bodies are strange.  Our grammars are strange.  I’m happy to accept the ‘it just so happens’ proof.”  He’s pleased by this, “Good!  And it’s not Hadot you should be reading, so much as his sources”  I point my finger at my friend and shake my head.  He’s a classicist and knows me to be under-read.

“So warring twins,” he says returning to my essay, “The disunities of scholarship and confession, philosophy and poetry.  Where will you find your synthesis?”  I reply, “In the war, I suppose,” but then take it back because it’s too clever to be true.  ”One will have to found Rome,” he warns.  But I had thought they were Jacob and Esau.  One clutching the other one’s heel.

C.

Julia Haslett’s Encounter with Weil

A group of women friends and I met up late last night for the local premier of Haslett’s confessional documentary An Encounter with Simone Weil.  Lingering in the streetlight curbside afterwards–all of us wishing we smoked–we discussed the film’s failures.  It was fragmented, wandering, shallow.  Haslett appears self-involved and weirdly out of touch.  Her montages of suffering, destruction, and death are trivializing, bewildering.  Most troublingly, no expression of Weil’s thought is taken up as the object of sustained inquiry.  Though the film opens with Weil’s extraordinary claim, “attention is the rarest and purest form of generosity,” Haslett never asks what attention is, what generosity can even mean here.  This simple, seemingly innocent elision makes a rabbit hole of the film.  In the descent we are introduced, not to Weil, not even to the suffering Weil addresses, but to Haslett’s suffering–the warren of her psychic environment–as one who merely quotes Weil and doesn’t yet know what she’s saying.

Harsh words.  I don’t like playing critic.  I’m glad she made her film.  Glad even that I saw it.  But why am I glad that I saw it?

With my friends on the curb it occurred to me that Haslett gives herself away with her plaintive admission “I am not a religious person” (this in dismayed response to Weil’s turn to Christianity).  Haslett is not a religious person; she has no sense (no intimation or faith or suspicion or hope) for a spiritual world laid over this.  In her most bizzarre comments she proves it, suggesting that had she or someone paid more attention, her father might not have committed suicide, her brother might not have overdosed.  Haslett’s is a material attention and it’s indexed to a set of material expectations.  Scanning photos with her camera, replaying footage of her brother’s impassive gaze, she reduces attention to “looking”–as though our eyes are all we have to behold with, as though we have no other organ of vision.  No other organ of vision, and no organ of choice whatsoever: Her father’s freedom, her brother’s freedom are eerily denied in the determinant economy of Haslett’s if-this-then-that.  Early in the film, Haslett intones: “My father’s death taught me that if I don’t pay attention, someone might die.”  What kind of lesson is that?  What kind of logic?

Not a logic that will unlock Weil.  Whether or not I pay attention someone will die.  By attending his death, by dying alongside him, it is only my life I keep.  Why am I glad that I saw Haslett’s film?  I suppose because the futile rattling on the closed doors of Weil’s texts ironically invites us into another order of attention–one whereby we witness the struggle of a blinded spirit and wonder whether and how this act of witness might yet be made generous–giving and free.

C.

Michel Foucault, Age 28

. . . The dream, like every imaginary experience, is thus a specific form of experience which cannot be wholly reconstituted by psychological analysis, one whose content points to man as transcended being.  The imaginary, sign of transcendence; the dream, experience of this transcendence under the sign of the imaginary . . .  It is as if a dream were an expression of that human freedom which can be inclined without being determined, which is illuminated without being constrained, and which receives warnings with something less than full evidence.  In the classical literature on dreams one can detect the whole theological dispute concerning Grace, the dream standing, so to speak, to the imagination as Grace does to the heart or the will . . .

. . . If the dream is the bearer of the deepest human meanings, this is not insofar as it betrays their hidden mechanisms or shows their inhuman cogs and wheels, but on the contrary, insofar as it brings to light the freedom of man in its most original form.  And when, in ceaseless repetition, it declares some destiny, it is bewailing a freedom which has lost itself, an ineradicable past, and an existence fallen of it sown motion into a definite determination . . . 

. . . The subject of the dream, the first person of the dream, is the dream itself, the whole dream.  In the dream, everything says, ‘I’, even the things and the animals, even the empty space, even objects distant and strange which populate the phantasmagoria.  The dream is an existence carving itself out in barren space, shattering chaotically, exploding noisily, netting itself, a scarcely breathing animal, in the webs of death.  It is the world at the dawn of its first explosion when the world is still existence itself and is not yet the universe of objectivity.  to dream is not another way of experienceing another world, it is for the dreaming subject the radical way of experiencing its own world.  This way of experience is so radical, because existence does not pronounce itself world  The dream is situated in that ultimate moment in which existence still is its world; once beyond, at the dawn of wakefulness already it is no longer its world . . . 

. . . Strictly speaking, the dream does not point to an archaic image, a phantasm, or a hereditary myth as its constituting elements; these are its prime matter, and they do not constitute its ultimate significance.  On the contrary, every act of imagination points implicitly to the dream.  the dream is not a modality of the imagination, the dream is the first condition of it possibility . . . 

“Dream, Imagination and Existence: An Introduction to Ludwing Binswanger’s ‘Dream and Existence,’” Translated by Forrest Williams

Always You Wrestle Inside Me (I)

Night after night I dream the Titanic.  I see the ship, a sharp glinting thing skating on a sea of glass.  I see the iceberg, breathing, warm, and black.  This is my task: to seduce the first mate, and subtly impress on him the necessity of a slight shift in course.  I can’t call the berg by name, can only insinuate it.  The captain wears a short clipped beard, stares straight ahead, grips the wheel, cares nothing for me.  If I’m to have any influence it will be through the deck officer.  We walk the bridge together.  I drag my fingers along the rail, play with my pearls, feign fear and laugh, my mind on that dark beast in the water.  He finds everything I say innocent, charming.  Nothing I say has the desired effect.  Nothing I say gives him pause.  I have to sway him.  We have to swerve.  He throws his head back over some coquettish antic of mine.  He is an idiot.  We’re too close.  It’s coming.  I can smell her.  She is a bear, fatted and sleeping.  She is a gorilla, mutely picking at grass.  We lurch.  I groan.  The pitch of pleated steel.  This is the sickening before drowning.  I wake.

I dream this dream for four nights.  The fifth night the same dream, but I am a small boy seeking the captain’s young daughter.  I find her.  I try to make friends with her.  I attempt a seduction but am childish, soft, and anyways my heart’s not in it.  In the dream, I am tired. The captain finds me a nuisance, tells me to stop bothering his daughter.  I watch his cold grey eyes and especially his brown burnished knuckles as he steers us straight into her.  I am relieved.  I wake with this same sense of relief.

The next night I dream a party, then a dance.

*

My parents waited til I was out of the worst of the woods to announce their divorce to us girls.

*

In a letter to someone I don’t know well I write of us as a family at sea.  I don’t mean very much by it.  Later it occurs to me that the captain is God.  And even had I been born a boy, their marriage would have foundered here.  It is not my fault–my failure to attract my father’s attention, to redirect him, and so skirt my mother’s depths.  It is not my fault.  I’ve seen His eyes and I’ve seen His hands and I’ve seen the decisiveness with which He drives us.

C.

Nietzsche on Aesthetics and Ethics

. . . one should recall the compulsion under which every language so far has achieved strength and freedom—the metrical compulsion of rhyme and rhythm. How much trouble the poets and orators of all peoples have taken … —‘submitting abjectly to capricious laws’, as anarchists say, feeling ‘free’, even ‘free-spirited’. But the curious fact is that all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and masterly sureness, whether in thought itself . . . , or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts just as in ethics, has developed only owing to the ‘tyranny of such capricious laws’; and in all seriousness, the probability is by no means small that this is ‘nature’ and ‘natural’—and not that laisser aller.

Every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting himself go his most ‘natural’ state is—the free ordering, placing, disposing, giving form in the moment of ‘inspiration’—and how strictly and subtly he obeys thousandfold laws precisely then, laws that precisely on account of their hardness and determination defy all formulation through concepts . . . [G]iven that, something always develops, and has developed, for whose sake it is worth while to live on earth; for example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality . . .

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §188

What is Needful

A goose, tobacco and cologne
Three winged and gold-shod prophecies of heaven,
The lavish heart shall always have to leaven
And spread with bells and voices, and atone
The abating shadows of our conscript dust.

Hart Crane, “For the Marriage of Faustus and Helen”

Her presentation was sublime: A biblical interpretation of environmental devastation carried on a song of mourning for nature and our innocence.  ”Yeah, okay, I get it,” barked the gentleman in the third row, “but doesn’t this smack of white privilege, the ivory tower, bleeding-heart liberalism?  I mean, it’s all well and good for us to sit around talking about sea turtles, but for people who are homeless this is crazy-talk.”  She inhaled, exhaled, purposefully let her slim fingers find the bottom corners of the podium, brought her chin up a bit and finally said very quietly, “I think that when people are sad they should know they are sad; I think it’s good that they should find ways of saying that they’re sad, and what it is they’re sad about.  I think we are grieving the loss of our home here, but I’m not sure we know we are grieving.  That’s what my project is about.”

Not long after I had coffee with a colleague.  In response to I-can’t-remember-what he pulled a common line about how our socio-economic privilege cuts us off from real suffering and what he called “basic human need.”  I countered that we are in no way cut off from real suffering; ‘we’ suffer as ‘they’ suffer, and it is our shared suffering that consecrates us–all of us–to one another’s keeping.  I went on to say that there’s no such thing as “basic human need.”  This, if anything, was the bourgeois indulgence.  We are never reduced to some animal nature; we are cultural creatures through and through.  ”Have you seen the camps of the very poor?” I demanded.  ”They are totems of artifact!  People buy big-screen TVs on credit; they want a piece of the social imaginary; or people buy drugs, steal drugs, to cope with same existential difficulties that you and I are struggling to cope with . . . ”  I would have gone on, but he fought back, “Catlin, you and I are not running for our lives in a desert under drone siege.  You and I are not dying.”  ”You and I are dying!” I cried.  ”We are all dying!”

Afterwards I wrote a friend and confessed my sense of shame:  ”We are all dying.  But none of us knows what it is to die.  Death is a truth not fitted for human knowledge, and so perhaps not fitted for human speech.  Who am I to speak the truth of our death?  I, who am as of yet living . . . ”  Weeks later, having survived major surgery, I remain haunted by the question.  I have survived.  And in the wake of extraordinary and unbidden love, that I live is no small embarrassment.  It strikes me as impertinent.  To have invited so many into the sphere of my fear . . .  Like leading a blind man to an apparent cliff and asking him to meditate with me on the seeming abyss . . .  Except that I too am blind and listening for the sea.  So we’re the blind leading the blind toward what we fantasize as Dover, hoping we know how to prepare ourselves, mis-taking fatal steps, saved by innumerable acts of God, rubbing our knees and nodding uncomprehending assent, eventually finding the very edge we were looking for, but not because this time illumined, rather in the same dark we were always in–a step, a slip, a fall.

The colleague I fought with over culture wrote to ask if there was anything he could to help me through recovery.  He had come across a line that reminded him of our talk.  From Simone Weil’s “The Mysticism of Work”: Workers need poetry more than bread. they need that their life should be a poem. They need some light from eternity.  Religion alone can be the source of such poetry.  It is not religion but revolution which is the opium of the people.  Deprivation of this poetry explains all forms of demoralization.

That I am as of yet living seems a miracle to me.  A miracle in the Wittgensteinian sense (which is to say nonsense).  How is it that I am impressed by a state of affairs to which I can imagine no alternative?  Like trying to imagine that the world should not exist: trying to imagine that I should not exist in it.  Still, I am impressed, heavy-hit, all but broken-witted by the fact of my survival.  Nonsense on nonsense: This weight is felt as an invitation to faith.  I know better than to credit the skies.  (A plane crashes; hundreds die; in an interview afterwards one of a few survivors gushes, “It just really proves to me that there’s a God;” we turn our heads away in disbelief.)  I know better than to credit the skies.  Still, I credit the care, the lit candles and long missives, the good vibes and healing energy, the worry and concern and terror even, the held breath and fingers crossed and text messages sent while I was under, the desperate hope, the silent questions, the open hands, the closed hands, the prayer.  And what does that mean, that I ‘credit’ these?  Just that they have become as mysterious to me as my survival so that my wonder over the one is also my wonder over the other.  I find myself throwing my arms wide (threshing the breadth if not the height).  This is an excess, an overrunning of order, the work of the spirit, a grace.

(My running partner is ever after me: “Every time you use the word ‘grace’ you invoke whole histories of hypocrisy, deception, oppression.  You’re calling upon broken metaphysical systems–”  I cut him off, “Look, Nate, all I’m trying to get at is this experience of wonder and then my sense of gratitude, of blessed-ness–”  ”There you go again!”  ”Okay, yes, there I go again, because I don’t know how else to talk about this.  You find me words that can do this work.”)

Of course nonsensical experience might just as well turn one away from faith as toward it.  I think of Arthur C. Clarke’s little story, “The Star,” in which a Jesuit astrophysicist is shaken in his calling by the slow revelation of a certain cosmic economy; I think also of Ivan Karamazov’s collected items of interest: an anthropology of men hung by their ears, women made to watch their infant children impaled on bayonets, babes shot in the face as they reach for the revolver . . .  Ivan scorns any account that would redeem the suffering of “these little ones.”  What redemption?  Ever?  How?  And I want to say, against Nate, that my gratitude in the one case needn’t commit me to pious thanksgiving for the crumpled plane still smoldering, for the screaming child, for her screaming mother.

Our dust is, truly, “conscript.” We are enlisted in evil.  Our hands are “volatile / Blamed, bleeding . . . ”  That our lives are leavened (I don’t say redeemed) by such trifles as “tobacco and cologne,” “bells and voices,” poetry, religion, basil in the window, a feather in the path, a pretty face on the train, can work to confirm our horror.  (Surely we are living for something more substantial than this . . . )  It can work to confirm our horror, or it can be the beginning of a new kind of truth-telling.  When we are sad we should know we are sad.  And when we are happy we should know we are happy, and we should be willing that our reasons for being happy make no reference to world peace or bare life, do not even strike us as good reasons.  What is needful?  A good pencil, a good talk, a heron stalking craw in the still-mineral-rich shallows.  We don’t know yet.  All these and more.

C.

Nietzsche on the Sense of Having Overslept

As far as the rest of life is concerned, the so-called ‘experiences’, – who of us ever has enough seriousness for them? or enough time? I fear we have never really been ‘with it’ in such matters: our heart is simply not in it – and not even our ear! On the contrary, like somebody divinely absent-minded and sunk in his own thoughts who, the twelve strokes of midday having just boomed into his ears, wakes with a start and wonders ‘What hour struck?’, sometimes we, too, afterwards rub our ears and ask, astonished, taken aback, ‘What did we actually experience then?’ or even, ‘Who are we, in fact?’ and afterwards, as I said, we count all twelve reverberating strokes of our experience, of our life, of our being – oh! and lose count . . . We remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do not understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are, the motto ‘everyone is furthest from himself’ applies to us for ever, – we are not ‘knowers’ when it comes to ourselves . . .

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Preface,” On the Genealogy of Morality

From The Spiritual Letters of Fenelon

Reblogged from Quantum Est In Rebus Inane:

Excerpted from a letter to the Countess of Gramont, March 21, 1692:

Take up again the readings that have touched you.  They will touch you again, and you will get more out of them than the first time.  Bear yourself without flattering yourself or becoming discouraged.  This happy medium is rarely found.  We promise ourselves great things of ourselves and of our good intentions, or else we despair of all.  

Read more… 113 more words

. . . the true Kingdom of God within us . . .

Merleau-Ponty on the Transparency of Language

“But therein lies the virtue of language: it is language which propels us toward the things it signifies.  In the way it works, to take us beyond the words to the author’s very thoughts, so that we imagine we are engaged with him in a wordless meeting of minds.  Once the words have cooled and been reaffixed to the page as signs, their very power to protect us far away from themselves makes it impossible for us to believe that are the source of so many thoughts.  Nevertheless, while we were reading, it is these words which spoke to us, suspended in the movement of our eyes and our feelings, which they in turn carried and projected unerringly when they rejoined in us the blind man and the paralytic, when they, thanks to us, and we thanks to them, became speech rather than language, and in the same instant became a voice and its echo.”

(The Prose of the World, second emphasis mine)